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Infection Rates and Risk Factors for Infection Among 
Health Workers During Ebola and Marburg Virus 
Outbreaks: A Systematic Review
Saranya A. Selvaraj,1 Karen E. Lee,2 Mason Harrell,3 Ivan Ivanov,4 and Benedetta Allegranzi5
1University of Maryland Medical Center, Baltimore; 2University of Dundee School of Nursing and Health Sciences, United Kingdom; 3Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, 
Massachusetts; 4Department of Public Health Environmental and Social Determinants of Health, and 5Department of Service Delivery and Safety, World Health Organization, 
Geneva, Switzerland
Background. Infection in health workers (HWs) has characterized outbreaks of Ebola virus disease (EVD) and Marburg virus 
disease (MVD). We conducted a systematic review to investigate infection and mortality rates and common exposure risks in HWs 
in EVD and MVD outbreaks.
Methods. We searched the EMBASE and PubMed databases to identify articles posted before 27 December 2017, with no lan-
guage restrictions. Data on the number, frequency, and mortality of HW infection and exposure risks were extracted.
Results. Ninety-four articles related to 22 outbreaks were included. HW infections composed 2%–100% of cases in EVD and 
5%–50% of cases in MVD outbreaks. Among exposed HWs, 0.6%–92% developed EVD, and 1%–10% developed MVD. HW infec-
tion rates were consistent through outbreaks. The most common exposure risk situations were inadequate personal protective equip-
ment and exposure to patients with unrecognized EVD/MVD. Similar risks were reported in past EVD/MVD outbreaks and in the 
recent outbreak in West Africa.
Conclusions. Many outbreaks reported high proportions of infected HWs. Similar HW infection rates and exposure risk factors 
in both past and recent EVD and MVD outbreaks emphasize the need to improve the implementation of appropriate infection con-
trol measures consistently across all healthcare settings.
Keywords. Ebola virus disease; Marburg virus disease; infection prevention and control; healthcare workers; occupational 
health.
 
Ebola and Marburg viruses are members of the Filoviridae (filovi-
rus) family and have an extremely high virulence and mortality rate, 
but no therapeutic treatments are currently available. Following 
infection from an animal reservoir, human-to-human transmission 
occurs through direct or indirect contact with blood or body fluids 
of a person who is infected with or has died from Ebola virus dis-
ease (EVD) due to one of the 4 species of Ebolavirus pathogenic in 
humans or from Marburg virus disease (MVD). The recent 2013–
2016 EVD outbreak in West Africa, particularly in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone, was of an unprecedented dimension and severity, 
leading to 28 616 EVD cases and 11 310 deaths [1].
Since the first reported outbreaks of MVD, in 1967 [2–4], and 
EVD, in 1976 [5, 6], health workers (HWs) have been recognized 
as having an increased risk of infection, owing to their occupational 
exposure to blood and body fluids, particularly in the absence of 
appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) and occupational 
health and safety measures. In developing countries, HW infection 
undermines fragile health systems by stretching already thin work-
forces. Outbreaks of deadly infection among HWs are considered 
red flags that should trigger suspicion for EVD or MVD and often 
result in nosocomial spread between staff and patients and then 
spread back into the community [7–12]. In the 2013–2016 West 
Africa EVD outbreak, the World Health Organization (WHO) pub-
lished an interim report indicating a huge impact on HWs, with 861 
(3.9%) confirmed or probable cases between 1 January 2014 and 8 
April 2015 for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone combined [13].
Measures to contain outbreaks rely on rapid detection and isola-
tion of cases, contact tracing, IPC in the community and healthcare 
facilities, and avoidance of funeral practices involving contact with 
the deceased. International guidelines have been available since 
1974 [14–16], but their implementation was initially difficult in the 
2013–2016 West Africa EVD outbreak because of the high number 
of cases and many gaps in infrastructure and supplies in the already 
challenged health systems of affected countries. We conducted a 
systematic review of the literature to identify and compare EVD 
and MVD infection rates among HWs to those of the general pop-
ulation. We also aimed to identify the most affected HW occupa-
tions and the most frequent exposure risk situations.
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METHODS
Search Strategy and Selection Criteria
We identified studies by searching the EMBASE and PubMed 
databases for articles posted before 27 December 2017, with 
no time or language restrictions (see Supplementary Tables  1 
and 2 for full search terms). HWs were defined as any person 
at risk for occupational exposure to EVD or MVD, ranging 
from HWs normally providing patient care, such as nurses, 
physicians, or traditional healers, to other workers who may 
have been exposed through their regular occupational duties or 
through being exceptionally asked to serve in a healthcare set-
ting. Additional articles were identified by searching reference 
lists by hand from retrieved publications and by reviewing the 
WHO archives.
After excluding duplicate references, 2 independent review-
ers screened the titles and abstracts of retrieved references. 
Potentially relevant articles were retrieved for full-text review 
and assessed for study eligibility, again by 2 independent 
reviewers. Interreviewer disagreement was resolved by consen-
sus or, if consensus could not be reached, by a third reviewer. 
Inclusion criteria were any mention of EVD/MVD in HWs that 
was accompanied by epidemiological data related to infection 
in HWs and/or qualitative descriptions of exposure risk situ-
ations and infection prevention practices. We also included 
published personal accounts, interviews, situation/field reports, 
and news items. Exclusion criteria were conference abstracts, 
reviews, and papers not containing primary data related to the 
research questions or not including any HW infections.
When available, data extraction included type of study or 
report; type of virus; year and location of the outbreak; place of 
HW exposure/employment; total numbers of persons who were 
exposed to and infected with the causal viruses; total number 
of persons who died from EVD/MVD; total numbers of HWs 
exposed to and infected with the causal viruses; total number 
of HWs who died from EVD/MVD; specific occupations (eg, 
nurse or environmental services staff) and numbers, by HW 
occupation, exposed or infected; exposure risk situations; and 
any breaches of IPC practices. Data were checked for accuracy 
by a second reviewer. PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items 
for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses) guidelines were 
adhered to during the search, review, data collection, and analy-
sis. When necessary, authors were contacted to clarify informa-
tion from the reviewed studies.
The percentage of infected HWs among infected patients 
was calculated by dividing the absolute number of HW infec-
tions reported by the total number of EVD or MVD cases in 
each study/report. The EVD or MVD rate among HWs was 
calculated by dividing the number of HW infections reported 
by the number of HWs documented as having been exposed 
to EVD or MVD. The definition of an “exposed” HW relied 
on definitions used by the studies/reports and could be based 
on a HW’s self-report of exposure or the authors’ assumption 
that a HW was at risk for exposure, as reported in nationwide 
population-based studies. Similarly, case definitions varied 
according to the study/report, including whether probable and/
or suspected infections were counted as cases. Owing to het-
erogeneity in the study designs/definitions, it was considered 
statistically inappropriate to perform a meta-analysis.
RESULTS
Our search yielded 2983 records after removal of duplicates. 
After screening by title and abstract, 447 were selected for 
full-text review. Ninety-four articles were included in the final 
data set (Supplementary Figure 1). These included information 
about HW infections from 22 outbreaks (MVD, 9; EVD, 13), 
which occurred between 1967 and 2017 and affected 17 coun-
tries (Table 1).
Proportion of Infected HWs Among Infected Patients
The location, year, and percentage of total infections, by 
EVD or MVD status, occurring in HWs are shown in Table 1. 
The percentage of all infected patients who were HWs 
ranged from 2% to 100%. Data from the 2013–2016 West 
Africa EVD outbreak show a range of 2.1% to 100% (n = 25; 
Table  1), depending on the cluster, similar to the range 
reported in other EVD outbreaks (n = 13; 2%–100%). HWs 
comprised 5%–50% of all cases in MVD outbreaks (n = 8). 
Most reports where HWs composed ≥50% of total infections 
involved small outbreaks in countries (the United Kingdom 
[17], South Africa [18], Nigeria [12], Spain [19, 20], and the 
United States [21]) where the index patients or tissue sources 
were originally infected in another country with an ongoing 
EVD/MVD outbreak (Table  1). In particular, of the 3 out-
breaks where 100% of infected patients were HWs, only the 
outbreak in the United Kingdom in 1976 involved a labo-
ratory technician; the outbreaks in Spain and South Africa 
affected other types of clinical staff (Table 1). Two outbreaks 
only had data on the proportion of HW deaths among the 
total number of deaths (4.6% in the 2005 Angola MVD out-
break [22] and 27% in the 2012 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo EVD outbreak [23]).
Proportion of Infected HWs in the Exposed HW Population, Compared 
With the Proportion of Cases in the General Population
Data for the calculation of the EVD or MVD rate in the HW 
population were available in 21 reports, which reported on sub-
sets of 6 different EVD and MVD outbreaks. In reports related 
to the recent West Africa outbreak (n = 15), the percentage of 
exposed HWs who developed EVD ranged from 0.6% to 92% 
(Table 2). In reports from earlier EVD/MVD outbreaks (n = 6), 
the percentage of exposed HWs who subsequently developed 
infection ranged from 12.5% to 76% (n = 3) for EVD and from 
1% to 10% (n = 3) for MVD.
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Table 1. Health Worker (HW) Infections, by Year and Country Location
Country (Additional Geographic 
Descriptors) Year Virus (Species)
Patients  
Infected, No.
HWs  
Infected, No.
HWs Infected as % of  
All Infections
Germany, former Yugoslavia [2] 1967 Marburg 31 5 16
South Africa [48, 49] 1975 Marburg 3 1 33
Sudan [6] 1976 Ebola (S) 284 75 26
Zaire [5] 1976 Ebola (Z) 318 15 5
Zaire (Tandala) [47] 1972–1978 Ebola (Z) 6 1 17
Sudan [10] 1979 Ebola (S) 34 2  
Kenya [50] 1980 Marburg 2 1 50
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[7, 9, 51–53, 56, 100]
1995 Ebola (Z) 315 80 [52] to 90 [97] 25 [52] to 32 [97]
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[45, 54, 58]
1994 Marburg 20 3 15 [45]
1997 Marburg 5 1 20 [45]
1998–2000 Marburg 154 7 5 [45]
Uganda [28, 29, 39, 55, 56, 101] 2000 Ebola (S) 425 31 7 [29]
Republic of the Congo, Gabon  
[102, 103]
2001–2002 Ebola (Z) 124 2 2 [100]
Republic of the Congo  
[56, 104, 105]
2003 (Jan–Apr) Ebola (Z) 143 3 2 [101, 102]
Republic of the Congo [106] 2003 (Nov–Dec) Ebola (Z) 35 1 3
 Angola (Uige hospital)a [22, 57, 59] 2005 Marburg 392a NR NR [22]
Uganda [30, 40, 60] 2007–2008 Ebola (B) 116 14 12 [60]
Democratic Republic of the Congoa 
[23]
2012 Ebola (B) 11a NR NR
Uganda [46] 2012 Marburg 14 2 14
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[27]
2014 Ebola (Z) 69 8 12
Uganda [83] 2017 Marburg 5 2 40
2013–2016 Ebola virus disease West Africa outbreak (species: Z)
Country Year Descriptors of Epidemiologic  
Clusters/Case Series
Patients With  
EVD, No.
HWs With  
EVD, No.
HWs infected as %  
of All Infections
Guinea [8, 13, 24, 42, 64,  
81, 107, 108]
2013–2016 Conakry, Mar–Apr 2014 37 14 38 [8]
Conakry, Boffa, and Telimele,  
Feb–Aug 2014
193 27 14 [105]
Conakry ETC, Mar–Aug 2014 90 17 19 [104]
Conakry, Jan 2014–Mar 2015 566 78 14 [13]
Nationwide, Jan–Dec 2014 2210 162 8 [24]
Liberia [13, 31–33, 43, 61, 62, 64, 
65, 81]
2014–2016 Nationwide, Mar–Aug 2014 810 97 12 [65]
Montserrado, Mar–Aug 2014 223 38c 17 [65]
Montserrado Jan 2014–Mar 2015 2829 136 4.8 [13]
Margibi, Jan 2014–Mar 2015 839 53 6.3 [13]
Lofa, Mar–Sep 2014 619 22 4 [32, 65]
St. Paul Bridge cluster, Jan–Feb 
2015
22 1 4.6 [33]
Sierra Leone [11, 13, 25, 34–38, 44, 
63, 64, 67, 69–74, 76, 77, 81, 84, 
85, 109–113]
2014–2016 Kenema, May 2014–Jan 2015 600 92 15 [71]
Kenema ETU, Jul 2014 109 11 10 [44]
Kenema, Jan 2014–Mar 2015 537 80 15 [13]
Nationwide, May–Oct 2014 3854 199 5 [25, 63]
Kailahun ETC, Jun–Oct 2014 489 28 6 [34]
Kailahun, Jun–Dec 2014 354 18 5 [70]
Bombali government hospital 
cluster, Oct–Nov 2014
2 1 50 [11]
Cluster from maternity clinic 
and ward of general hospital 
in Tonkolili, Oct–Nov 2014
7 1 14 [11]
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Six papers related to the 2013–2016 West Africa outbreak 
included data that could be used to compare an EVD infec-
tion rate (none were available for MVD) for HWs to that for 
non-HWs (Table  3). Two were population-based studies that 
calculated nationwide incidence rates for EVD in HWs ver-
sus the general population in Guinea [24] and Sierra Leone 
[25] during the 2013–2016 outbreak. In Guinea, HWs had a 
47-fold increased risk for EVD as compared to the general pop-
ulation. In Sierra Leone, HWs had a 100-fold increased risk as 
compared to the general population. A third population-based 
report from the WHO [13] reported EVD infection rates for 3 
subcategories of HWs only (physicians, nursing staff, and lab-
oratory technicians) and calculated a 21–32-fold increased risk 
of infection in these HWs as compared to the risk for the gen-
eral population.
A further 3 studies provided data on infection rates in HWs 
who contact with index cases as compared to non-HWs with 
such contact. Of these, 2 reported no EVD infections in 20 non-
HWs who had contact with the 3 EVD HW cases diagnosed in 
the US outbreak, compared with 2 infections among 149 HWs 
who had contact with these cases [21, 26]. One report tracked 
the transmission chain of nosocomial EVD spread in a mater-
nity ward in Sierra Leone in October 2014 and found a higher 
infection rate in non-HW contacts (28%), compared with HW 
contacts (3.6%) [11].
Most-Affected HW Occupations
Figure  1 shows the HW occupations most exposed to EVD/
MVD. Nursing staff were the most frequently identified (61 of 
67 reports [91%]), followed by medical staff (54 of 67 [81%]) 
and laboratory staff (19 of 67 [28%]). Additional occupations 
identified were medical auxiliaries, students, pharmacists, 
phlebotomists, radiographers, counselors, transporters, burial 
teams, a prisoner asked to provide care in the hospital for 
another prisoner, and a construction worker on a building site 
at a healthcare facility. Supplementary Table 3 lists the occupa-
tions and titles identified as HWs.
HW Mortality Rates
Twenty articles reported HW deaths resulting in case-fatality rates 
(CFRs) of 50% or greater due to EVD [5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 24, 27–
38], including reports from the 2013–2016 West Africa outbreak 
[8, 11, 13, 24, 31–38] and from the 2014 Sudan outbreak, in 
which the CFR was 100% [27]). In 8 reports, the HW CFR from 
EVD ranged between 12% and 49% [12, 25, 39–44]. Among 
outbreaks of MVD with HW deaths, the HW CFR ranged from 
50% to 100% [45, 46]. In some smaller outbreaks with limited 
local transmission of EVD or MVD, the reported HW CFR was 
0% [2, 17, 21, 26, 47–50].
Most-Frequent Exposure Risks
Risk situations and factors contributing to EVD/MVD HW 
exposure and infection were identified in 69 articles [5–7, 9–12, 
17, 18, 21, 22, 24–28, 30–33, 35–44, 47, 48, 50–86] (Figure 2). 
Among the 5 major categories identified, “insufficient/incorrect 
use of personal protective equipment [PPE]” was the most fre-
quently cited exposure risk. In many situations, deficiencies in 
PPE use arose from the lack of availability of appropriate equip-
ment and/or the lack of training in PPE use during patient care, 
patient transport, and cleaning and environmental disinfection 
activities [5, 6, 9–11, 18, 22, 24–26, 28, 32, 36, 38–40, 42, 43, 50–
54, 56, 58, 61–65, 69–74, 78–80, 85, 86]. Less commonly, HWs 
were observed to engage in behavior such as rubbing the eyes 
[52], smoking [9, 39], and using a mobile telephone [39], thus 
risking exposure to mucus membranes. One study found that 
the most frequent type of exposure incident (63 of 77 exposures 
Country Year Descriptors of Epidemiologic  
Clusters/Case Series
Patients With  
EVD, No.
HWs With  
EVD, No.
HWs infected as %  
of All Infections
Pujehun, 2014–2015 49 3 6 [76]
Western Area, 2014–2015 4955 179c 3.6 [109]
Koinadugu, 2014–2015 142 3 2.1 [110]
Countries with Ebola virus disease importation followed by local transmission
Country Year Country Where Index Patient Was  
Infected (Ebola Virus species)
Patients Infected, 
No.
HWs Infected, No. HWs Infected as % of All 
Infections
England [17] 1976 Sudan (S)b 1 1 100
South Africa [18] 1996 Gabon (Z) 2 2 100
Nigeria [12, 41, 66, 79, 82] 2014 Liberia (Z) 20 11 [12, 79] or  
13 [41, 82]
55 [12, 79] or 65 [41, 82]
 Spain [19, 20] 2014 Sierra Leone (Z) 3 3 100 [20]
USA [21, 26, 68, 75, 78, 80]  2014 Liberia (Z) 3 2 67 [21, 26, 78]
Abbreviations: B, Bundibugyo ebolavirus; NR, not reported; S, Sudan ebolavirus; Z, Zaire ebolavirus.
aFor these 2 outbreaks, only data on HW deaths as a proportion of all deaths were available. The proportion of HW deaths out of total deaths was 4.6% in 2005 Angola MVD outbreak [22] 
and 27% in the 2012 Democratic Republic of Congo EVD outbreak [23].
 bLaboratory technician infected via a needlestick injury while processing human tissue from Sudan as part of an outbreak investigation.
cData extrapolated from the percentage of HWs reported as infected; the number was not reported originally in the citation.
Table 1. Continued
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/infdis/jiy435/5091974 by Library - D
uncan of Jordanstone user on 20 Septem
ber 2018
Health Workers and EVD/MVD Outbreaks • JID 2018:XX (XX XXXX) • S5
among 57 HWs) was to skin on the face (including mucosa), 
because goggles/respirator masks did not stay correctly in place 
during patient care [42]. In one outbreak, HWs refused to wear 
PPE, to support the morale of infected coworkers [58].
Exposure at the point of care was the second most frequently 
cited exposure risk category in many reports, particularly to 
patients with unrecognized EVD/MVD [6, 9–12, 18, 21, 24, 
26–28, 31–33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 48, 50, 52, 57, 58, 60, 62, 64, 
66, 67, 69, 72, 75, 82, 83, 85, 86] and to cadavers during unsafe 
burial practices [7, 22, 30, 39, 40, 48, 50, 51, 57, 59, 60, 65, 81]. 
Inadequate hand hygiene was a frequent factor leading to expo-
sure at the point of care [9, 22, 28, 38, 40, 53, 62]. The third cat-
egory of risk was inappropriate risk assessment, including lack 
of recognition of potential EVD in corpses [25, 52]. The fourth 
category related to a lack of environmental/engineering controls, 
including the absence of functional isolation wards or segrega-
tion [5, 10, 22, 25, 36, 39, 43, 48, 50–52, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 68, 74, 
77, 86] and a lack of standard operating procedures to reduce the 
infection risk [25, 38, 68, 70, 75, 80, 86]. Several infrastructure 
deficiencies contributing to exposure risk were included in this 
category, such as a lack of electricity or running water; a lack of 
sharps disposal boxes; shortages of soap, chlorine, and other dis-
infection supplies; and inadequate/absent waste disposal meth-
ods [7, 10, 22, 25, 40, 44, 51, 56, 62, 63, 68, 70, 71]. In some areas, 
there were delays in the laboratory diagnosis of EVD/MVD [25, 
32, 63] and a lack of safe transportation vehicles [25].
 The fifth category was related to shortages of human 
resources. In particular, a lack of IPC specialists and frontline 
Table 2. Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease Rates in Health Workers (HWs) Exposed to Infected Patients
Country (Cluster) Year Virus
HW Infections as % 
of All Infections
HWs  
Exposed, No.
HWs  
Infected, No.
Exposed HWs 
Infected, %
South Africa [48] 1975 Marburg 33 35 1 3
South Africa [49] 1975 Marburg 33 100 1 1
Sudan (Maridi) [6] 1976 Ebola 28 230 72 31
Zaire (Yambuku Mission Hospital) [5] 1976 Ebola 5 17 13 76
Zaire (Ngaliema) [5] 1976 Ebola 5 16 2 12.5
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kiwit General 
Hospital) [53]
1995 Ebola 25 427 37 9
Democratic Republic of the Congo [58] 1998–2000 Marburg 5 63 6 10
Sierra Leone (nationwide) [25] 2014 Ebola 5 2402 199 8
Sierra Leone (nationwide) [38] 2014 Ebola NR 2435 293 12
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital ETU) [36] 2014 Ebola 5 27 24 89
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital ETU) [37] 2014 Ebola NR 26 24 92
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital ETU) [71] 2014 Ebola 15 62 18 29
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital general wards) [71] 2014 Ebola 15 83 48 58
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital, all staff/volun-
teers) [71]
2014 Ebola 15 472 66 14
Sierra Leone (Kenema Hospital ETU, July 
2014) [44]
2014 Ebola 10 45 11 24
Sierra Leone (Bombali district government hos-
pital) [11]
2014 Ebola 50 39 1 2.6
Sierra Leone (maternity clinic and ward of general 
hospital in Tonkolili district) [11]
2014 Ebola 14 28 1 3.6
Guinea (nationwide) [24] 2014 Ebola 7.9 11 529 162 1.4
Liberia (St. Paul Bridge Cluster) [33] 2015 Ebola 4.6 166 1 0.60
Spain [20] 2014 Ebola 100 117 1 0.85
USA [21, 26] 2014 Ebola 66 149 2 1.3
Abbreviations: ETC, Ebola treatment center; ETU, Ebola treatment unit; NR, not reported.
Table 3. Ebola Virus Disease Rate in Health Workers Compared to Non–Health Workers (HWs) Exposed to Patients With Ebola
Country (Cluster) Year HWs Exposed, No.
% of Exposed 
HWs Infected Non-HWs Exposed, No.
% of Exposed Non-HWs 
Infected
USA (Dallas, TX) [21, 26] 2014 149 1.3 30 0
Sierra Leone (Tonkolili maternity 
clinic and ward) [11]
2014 28 3.6 18 28
Sierra Leone [25] 2014 2402 8 3.49 million 0.08
Guinea [24] 2014 2210 1.4 6.15 million 0.03
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra  
Leone [13]
2014–2015 General population infection rate, 0.14%; physician infection rate, 2.95%; registered nurse infec-
tion rate, 4.37%; laboratory technicians infection rate, 4.04%
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healthcare staff, combined with delayed/unpredictable pay-
ment of salaries [25, 36, 38, 39, 50, 51, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70–74, 84, 
85], were identified as sources of provider stress that could con-
tribute to risk exposure. One report noted that 4 of 5 infected 
HWs worked commonly or exclusively at night, which was also 
a risk factor for HW stress/fatigue and reduced levels of super-
vision [43].
In 2 clusters of infection, in the United States and Spain, 
where community exposure to EVD/MVD was not a factor, 
infected HWs did not report exposure due to specific IPC 
breaches during care [19–21]. One report from the Spain cluster 
proposed that the infected HW was “likely exposed to fomites” 
[20] during her work, although a specific incident related to 
fomite exposure was not identified. In the US cluster, one of the 
infected HWs reported after recovery that there were no stan-
dard IPC protocols in place for EVD at the hospital where she 
worked [80].
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first extensive systematic review 
investigating EVD and MVD in HWs and exploring the risk 
situations and factors leading to exposure in this population. 
We identified published reports from 74% of known EVD 
outbreaks and 70% of known MVD outbreaks [87, 88]. HW 
infections as a proportion of all cases in an EVD or MVD clus-
ter or outbreak ranged from 2% to 100% (Table  1). Clusters 
with the highest proportion (ie, >50%) of EVD or MVD cases 
occurring in HWs were usually smaller outbreaks in countries 
where EVD/MVD was not circulating in the local population 
but introduced by an isolated traveler/individual. In areas with 
endemic or locally circulating EVD/MVD in the recent West 
Africa outbreak, the proportion of infected HWs ranged from 
2.1% to 50%, similar to findings in earlier outbreaks (range, 
2%–50%), contrasting with an overall figure of 3.9% reported 
by the WHO for 2014 to March 2015 [13]. The higher pro-
portion of HWs cases in many of the reports included in our 
review is likely because many of the included clusters were 
from an early stage in the West Africa outbreak. At that time, 
there would have been less awareness among HWs of circulat-
ing EVD and the precautions necessary to prevent infection, as 
well as lower stocks of appropriate PPE and limited numbers of 
Ebola treatment centers and trained staff relative to the size of 
the outbreak (Table 1).
Data were limited on the proportion of HWs who became 
infected after EVD or MVD exposure (Table 2). Available data 
highlight great disparities between HW infection rates in coun-
tries where EVD and MVD are likely endemic in animal reser-
voirs (range, 3%–92%), compared with countries with smaller 
infection clusters due to importation (range, 0.85%–1.3%; n = 3 
studies). Only 6 studies, all from the 2013–2016 EVD outbreak, 
compared infection rates in exposed HWs to rates in the gen-
eral population/non-HWs, presumably because of the difficulty 
of assessing exposure in the community setting (Table 3). Three 
were population-based studies, which identified a 21–100-fold 
increase in the EVD rate in HWs, compared with that in the 
general population (Table 3 [13]). Only 1 paper, which tracked 
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nosocomial EVD spread in a maternity ward, found a higher 
rate of infection in non-HW contacts versus HWs [11]. This 
may reflect both higher risk exposures in the non-HW contacts 
(peripartum women and newborns accounted for half of all 
infections), as well as an increased awareness of EVD and the 
use of PPE by HWs at the time of the study.
Mortality data were reported in a low number of included 
papers, and CFR among HWs varied significantly. In general, 
rates were >50% in both historical and recent outbreaks of EVD 
and MVD, although a few reports with information on HW 
deaths had CFRs between 10% and 40%. Overall, these findings 
are consistent with the results of 2 other systematic reviews/
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meta-analyses identified in our search, both with a focus on 
the 2013–2016 West Africa outbreak and reporting HW CFRs 
of ≥45% for affected countries [89, 90]. A  recent study of 27 
patients (22 HWs) with EVD treated in Europe and the United 
States reported 5 deaths, for a CFR of 18.5% [91], highlighting 
that while mortality may be lower in high-resource settings 
owing to timelier and/or more-appropriate treatment, a signif-
icant proportion of infections still results in death, including 
HW deaths.
Among HWs, nursing was the occupation most frequently 
mentioned as being exposed to EVD/MVD, consistent with 
data showing that infections involving nurses composed over 
half of all HW infections in the recent outbreak [13]. However, 
healthcare delivery has become increasingly complex by involv-
ing workers from many different occupations. Even with our 
wide search string, certain occupations associated with occu-
pational EVD/MVD exposure were identified only during 
the data-extraction process, and future IPC education efforts 
should also take this into consideration.
Both the earliest documented outbreak of EVD, in 1976, and 
the recent 2013–2016 outbreak reported high infection rates of 
exposed HWs [5, 36]. This is likely associated with infection con-
trol deficiencies that were present in both earlier outbreaks and 
the recent outbreak, including a lack of PPE and environmen-
tal/engineering controls, lack of or inefficient triage and failure 
to recognize patients with EVD/MVD, and a shortage of human 
resources. Reports and surveys from the 1995 EVD outbreak 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified nonfunc-
tional isolation wards for suspected EVD cases, a lack of water 
and electricity, no waste disposal system, no PPE for medical 
staff, staff shortages, and inconsistent hand hygiene practices 
[51, 53]. Almost 2 decades later, similar deficiencies were 
reported in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 2013–2016 
outbreak [25, 33, 62]. The persistence of similar deficiencies 
through decades of outbreaks, combined with the continued 
high HW infection rate, emphasizes the need to improve the 
long-standing lack of IPC infrastructures and supplies and 
the poor adherence to standard precautions and occupational 
health and safety measures in all healthcare settings. This is 
also clearly confirmed by the Global Health Observatory, which 
reported joint external evaluations assessing country capacity 
to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to public health risks. 
2016 data from 64 countries showed that only 19% had demon-
strated IPC capacity that accorded with international standards 
at the facility level; among low- and middle-income countries, 
this proportion was reduced to 2 of 38 countries [92]. In addi-
tion to improving current IPC practices and infrastructures, 
there is also urgent need for more-innovative PPE features and 
designs, particularly to address increased safety, usability, and 
comfort to best protect frontline HWs from filovirus trans-
mission, especially in tropical climates. Based on international 
expert consensus, the WHO recently issued guidance on the 
characteristics of safer equipment, which will hopefully drive 
research and innovation [93].
Several studies compared the number of HW infec-
tions before and after the institution of IPC measures. In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1995 EVD outbreak, the 
introduction of IPC measures at Kikwit General Hospital 
resulted in 1 HW infection as compared to 79 previously 
[51, 52]. Similarly, in the West Africa outbreak a reduction in 
the incidence of infection in HWs as a proportion of all cases 
(from 12% in July 2014 to 1% in February 2015) was observed, 
which may have been due to coordinated efforts by interna-
tional and nongovernmental organizations to provide support 
and guidance leading to improved IPC practices [13]. Errors 
in the donning and doffing of PPE were recognized early on 
as contributing to the West Africa outbreak, leading to new 
interim guidance [14, 15]. A 2014 observational study in pri-
mary healthcare facilities in Kenema, Sierra Leone, found con-
sistent glove reuse and poor hand hygiene. Donning and doffing 
in the correct order occurred in only 3% of observations. These 
factors improved significantly after appropriate training 
[94]. To lower infection rates even further, facilities must con-
tinue to educate and enforce the most up-to-date IPC guidelines 
and introduce systems for managing occupational health and 
safety, including work organization.
Working with patients who have unrecognized EVD/MVD 
was the second most commonly cited exposure risk mentioned 
in both earlier outbreaks and the recent outbreak. However, the 
presenting symptoms of EVD/MVD are also common to many 
other endemic illnesses that are far more frequent and do not nec-
essarily require the same strict IPC measures. During outbreaks, 
exposure to unrecognized patients has been reduced by the use of 
triage tools, isolation of suspect cases, use of standard precautions 
and barrier nursing techniques, and improvement in laboratory 
infrastructures to reduce the time to diagnosis [51, 52], such as the 
introduction of new point-of-care tests for EVD that can be run 
quickly at health centers lacking laboratory facilities [95].
Phase 3 trials of the recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus 
Zaire Ebola virus vaccine have shown promising results as 
another method of reducing the infection risk in HWs who 
might be exposed during the initial triage and evaluation of 
patients [96]. However, data are still insufficient to establish 
whether the vaccine confers long-term protection, and preclini-
cal studies in nonhuman primates suggest that the vaccine may 
not confer complete cross-protection against MVD and other 
EVD species known to be pathogenic in humans [97]. Until 
vaccination is demonstrated to confer long-term immunity 
against all species of EVD and MVD, the continued and appro-
priate use of IPC methods will remain crucial for protecting 
frontline HWs and preventing nosocomial spread of infection 
and amplified transmission out into the community.
The very high rate of EVD and MVD infections among HWs 
as compared to the general population indicates that all such 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/infdis/jiy435/5091974 by Library - D
uncan of Jordanstone user on 20 Septem
ber 2018
Health Workers and EVD/MVD Outbreaks • JID 2018:XX (XX XXXX) • S9
infections should be considered as occupational diseases when 
they occur among HWs and other workers at high risk of expo-
sure. The list of occupational diseases from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) includes diseases caused by bio-
logical agents at work “where a direct link is established sci-
entifically, or determined by methods appropriate to national 
conditions and practice, between the exposure to these biolog-
ical agents arising from work activities and the disease(s) con-
tracted by the worker (p. 3)” [98]. Such cases should be properly 
investigated to rule out nonoccupational exposure and noti-
fied as occupational diseases to the authority responsible for 
employment injury benefits. The WHO and ILO recommend 
that HWs with EVD and MVD resulting from work activities 
should have the right to compensation, as well as free rehabili-
tation and access to curative services [99].
Our study has some limitations. Notably, the heteroge-
neous nature of the retrieved publications limited the use of 
a more sophisticated analysis by pooling data. Several papers 
mentioned certain occupations as separate from HWs, even 
though these met our definition of “HW.” Occasional discrep-
ancies were noted in numbers in published reports as compared 
to data from government/nongovernmental organizations 
[27, 45–47, 52, 53, 60, 71] and sometimes within reports related 
to the same cluster/outbreak [12, 41, 79, 82]. This may have been 
due to several factors, such as differences in case definitions and 
disparate definitions of both HWs and exposure between stud-
ies, resulting in different numbers of HWs reported as exposed 
or infected within the same outbreak [12, 41, 48, 49, 79, 82], and 
incomplete reporting to national databases [65].
To conclude, high HW infection rates and similar expo-
sure risk factors in both past and recent EVD and MVD out-
breaks highlight the need to urgently strengthen IPC program 
implementation at the facility level to ensure patient and HW 
safety in everyday care service delivery and in the event of an 
outbreak. Our data also represent a useful addition to inform 
models designed to estimate the impact of various prevention 
strategies and to emphasize that HWs also risk their lives for the 
patients under their care.
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